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In these days, when we are coming more and more to see exceptional
merit in the so-called "functional approach" to the study of law, it is not
difficult to hear the queries, Why should anyone study legal history? Is
not the law of today the only vital and real law? Who cares about out-
worn law and technicalities? Do we not suffer enough from the rough
edges in our working institutional structure to spare ourselves the cares
of the study of obsolete counterparts?
William S. Holdsworth, eminent English historian, answers these
questions by distinguishing between "mere antiquarianism" and "effective
legal history."1 Quoting from the legal historian of an earlier year,
Selden, Holdsworth urges that we avoid "the sterile part of antiquity."
In effective legal history, however, we have a record of the beginnings
of principles, rules, and institutions which have stood the test of cen-
turies and are in force today. To know legal history is to commune
with the judicial patriarch; but to respect the communion too credulously
leads to unintelligent anti-liberalism. A critical acceptance of tradition
adds a fourth dimension, time, to the particularized concepts of the
functional approach. Reforms arise not from absolute but from relative
considerations-because one means is, or is expected to be, better than
another in accomplishing jural ends. Tradition is the instrumentality
for explaining away the present in the expectation of experiencing a
richer future.
The study of Anglo-American legal history is particularly important.
Our law originated in England. Our language is English. Our ideology
emergent from or coincidental with these common forces is constituted
of fundamentally similar political and ethical standards. On points of
similarity the legal and political institutions may improve from the study
of common experience; on points of difference the trends of divergence
may be traced to precipitate more clearly essential distinctions.
The most recent American contribution to this field has been made
by Max Radin. His Handbook of Anglo-zimerican Legal History is a
brief, lucid, and scholarly summary of the subject to date.
Professor Radin says it is a common mistake to hold that the Com-
1 Holdsworth, William Searle, Some Lessons in Oar Legal History, p. 6.
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mon Law (He capitalizes it rigorously) consists of Anglo-Saxon folk-
ways carried into England from Germany and remolded by the course
of events in England and America. This, unfortunately, was a postu-
late of Edward Coke, whose Institutes and Reports dominated the legal
thinking from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, when Black-
stone published his Commentaries without correcting the myth. As a
matter of fact, the Common Law grew casually and unobtrusively.
Principles that are now part and parcel of it were originally simple
expedients to accomplish an administrative end without the least purpose
of displacing existing systems. The Common Law is basically "admin-
istrative law." The task of administration deals essentially with prop-
erty rights established by custom. The early royal administrators relied
on legal principle in developing a routine for collecting the king's dues.
As their methods proliferated the "susbtantive law grew up 'in the inter-
stices of procedure.' "' This is the Common Law raison d'etre. It is
this same haphazard, informal development that has given the law its
flexibility, yet principles (canonized) within this evolution have been ban-
ners about which have rallied alternately or simultaneously the educated
authoritarian in the highly civilized community and the pioneer whose
chief right is personal liberty.
When one mentions the Common Law he must also state the time
of which he speaks, to define it. Latin, French, and Italian cultures
were injected into it in the Norman Conquest. It does not appear that
a single man at Runnymede and the signing of the Magna Carta in
1215 was an Englishman. To be one was a sign of low social rank.
It was not until 1400 that the king addressed Parliament in English.
The language of the law was Law-French for two centuries more.
Latin was the language of writs even after Law-French was abolished.
The whole structure of feudalism with its complex obligations-fealty,
subinfeudation, primogeniture, the "curtesy of England," and even the
cogwheel of the English administrative system, the Exchequer, had
Continental equivalents.
The spiritual and cultural light which set the Dark Ages to fading
in the eleventh century was much the same on both sides of the English
Channel. Roman Law was revived; Canon Law was reformed. How
much of each has become our heritage no one can say definitely, since
investigators of the Common Law have maintained an aloof ignorance
of Roman and Canon Law. The expression in the English law of this
influence is certainly substantial.
" Radin, Anglo-American Legal History, p. 75, quoting from Henry Sumner Maine's
Early History of Institutions.
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The Common Law began under Henry I with the establishment
of the Exchequer in the twelfth century. Originally itinerant justices
were sent out to render secure the position of the king in the feudal
structure. The Exchequer grew to become a real court as well as an
administrative agency.
At the beginning of the thirteenth century came Magna Carta and
near the end of he same century the statutes, "Quia Emptores" and
"De Donis." The former statute abolished subinfeudation, and the lat-
ter converted conditional gifts into a new estate, fee tail. These were
radical modifications of the feudal structure. "De Donis" in combina-
tion with the rule of primogeniture created a "landed gentry" class in
England which has played a major r~le in economic history down to the
present day and which is even now simultaneously waving white flags at
Fascism and its own labor class to maintain itself. America revolted
against the fee tail as an emblem of aristocracy. Many states have
expressly abolished it by statute; other have modified it beyond recog-
nition.
For a hundred and fifty years after John's Great Charter became
a part of the legal system the Common Law indulged in an adolescent
introspection and self-appreciation. It had accumulated enough experi-
ence recorded in the Year Books and early private reports to afford the
basis for decision in novel cases. In fact by the time of commentator
Littleton, I450, lawyers had begun to urge the authority of decided
cases as such. Even this early, crystallization in the elaborate legal pro-
cedure gave cause for the supplementary jurisdiction of Chancery and
the body of law which that court developed.
In the seventeenth century, the Dutch Grotius, the French Descar-
tes, and the English Bacon cast the dies for a new mode of research.
They fathered scientific method expressed in a spirit of critical analysis
of substantiated facts. A number of legal historians adopted the Baconian
method-accurate statement with due restraint. "The engrossment of
lawyers in practical questions made such researches seem mere anti-
quarnianism, but their books are fundamental in the history of the law."
(Page 297). One must qualify the status of such inquiries, however, by
the recollection that Edward Coke's expositions of the Common Law
were the standard authority until the publication of Blackstone's Corn-
mentaries in 1761. Coke was an excellent lawyer, but an unreliable
and unscrupulous historian. He was a strict constructionist, an opponent
of Chancery, and against any substantial change in the Common Law.
Probably the most important substantive development during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries came from the ingrafting of the
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Law Merchant. It remained for the impulse of the French Revolution
to set in motion major changes in the English legal structure. "Rapid
liquidation took place of most of the vestiges of feudal law and feudal
conditions. The penal law was radically changed, body execution in
civil cases practically abolished and the courts completely reorganized.
Property rights of married women were recognized and the commercial
law summarized and restated in fragmentary codes. (Page 533).
This reform was further inspired by the utilitarian philosophy of
Jeremy Bentham as given political application by Samuel Romilly and
Henry Brougham, legal reformers, efficient and tenacious.
It must be remembered, however, that the influence of Bentham
has always been less than that of John Austin (790-1859), whose
theory of law as a rigid logical structure has appealed to the legal tech-
nicians to this day.
It seems that in spite of these writers the study of legal theory and
scientific history as a means of clarifying shifting legal concepts has been
undertaken only within the last hundred years. In this regard Frederick
William Maitland has dene epoch-making work in constitutional history.
Studies of his kind have laid the basis for Holmes, Pound, and others in
America and for many writers on similar or divergent theories in France,
Germany, and Italy, as well as England.
Reform in the last century in legal administration was particularly
aided by Judge Blackburn, who, among others, put the commercial
side of the Common Law in proper relation to mercantile practice. In
Equity, Chancellors Jessel and Fry reinstated the humanitarian inci-
dence of which the brilliant Lord Eldon had sought to deprive it. Dur-
ing the last hundred years modernization of the law has been especially
patent in domestic relations, real property, corporations, and procedure.
In anticipating prospective trends of the Common Law, one can not but
predict an assimilation to the Continental systems. Even now, the
Common Law devices, trusts and estoppel, have general European
acceptance. On the other hand, there seems to be some likelihood that
Common Law countries will obliterate the many pseudo-distinctions
between real and personal property that do not hold in countries on the
Continent.
Whatever Professor Radin's book lacks in completeness may be
justified on the grounds that it does catch trends and that in the course
of the brief discussion of hundreds of legal concepts, of legal literature,
and of the legal profession there is abundant reference to more exhaus-
tive discussion of the point in question. It is a book especially for the
student who by the pressure of circumstance can not look more than
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briefly at the subject-one volume, major points presented in outline
form, and succinctly elaborated. It is a reminder, in the author's own
words, "that this law [is] . . . more than the archeological museum
it has often appeared to be and something less than a set of general
rules abstracted from time, and space, and circumstance." (Preface,
page v).
LEO STONE
LAW AS LIBERATOR - Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr. The Founda-
tion Press, Chicago. 1937
Law as Liberator consists of six lectures delivered by Judge Hutche-
son before the University of Virginia Law School. They are written in
oratorical style, and set forth in vigorous fashion the writer's faith in the
democratic form of government.
The author deplores the prevalent attitude of indifference toward
governmental problems. In contrast to the present period when the
principles of democracy "have lost their dynamic power to stir," he
points to the confidence which writers of the x 8th century had in democ-
racy. "Men learn but to forget, to learn and forget again. Because they
do it has been difficult, until recently, for some of us to feel, or even to
sympathetically understand, the dynamic, the shattering force of the
politico-legal ideas which in the I 7 th and 18th centuries, came to dom-
inate the thinking and the life of a great part of the Western world."
Judge Hutcheson is more in sympathy with the writings of this era than
with the developments of the present. He finds himself in accord with
what he terms "the older value judgments" and views with alarm the
modern trend toward a declining emphasis on moral and spiritual values
and on political and civil liberty. He deplores the aims of the "social
justice economists" who are attempting to remake the government into
an institution designed to control the economic destiny of the nation.
"They speak and act," he writes, "as though but for them and their
ideas, the world would be lost. But the really, the deeply wise, know
better. They have always known that the good life, social as well as
individual, is rooted deep in proven, though changing ideals."
Despite the advocacy of a program which is essentially reactionary,
the author characterizes himself as a liberal. By training as well as by
practice he is, he says, a balancer of interests. He recognizes the need
for change and is confident that change will come if we simply have the
patience to follow the methods of the common law. Through advances
in judge-made law, through legislative enactments, and, on rare occa-
